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Abstract 
 
Generally accepted auditing standards permit auditors to apply both statistical and nonstatistical 
sampling techniques in obtaining sufficient, competent evidential matter.  However, several recent 
studies have shown that statistical sampling procedures have nearly disappeared from practice. 
Despite this trend and the heightened anxiety about professional liability, no studies to date have 
directly tested the potential implications of sampling method on jurors verdicts, damage awards, 
or sample size expectations.  In this study we investigate the effect of sampling method on jurors’ 
judgments in auditor negligence trials.  Overall, in a case where auditors were alleged to have 
used an insufficient sample size, the sampling method did not affect the likelihood of a “guilty of 
negligence” verdict.  However, as predicted, damage awards were significantly higher when non-
statistical sampling was used compared with statistical sampling.  Exploratory analysis revealed 
that subjects voting “guilty of negligence” would require the auditors to examine over 17% of the 
population (compared with the 1% examined) in order to change their verdict to “not guilty of 
negligence.”  These findings have troubling implications for auditors employing sampling tech-
niques. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
enerally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) permit auditors to apply both statistical and nonstatistical, or 
judgmental, sampling techniques in obtaining sufficient, competent evidential matter (AICPA 2000, 
AU§350.04).  Research has generally shows that nonstatistical sampling is problematic (e.g., Burgstahler et 
al 2000; Hall et al. 2000; Nelson 1995; Ponomon and Wendell 1995; Kachelmeier and Messier 1990), and some au-
ditors believe that the ability to statistically measure the risk makes statistical sampling more defensible (Colbert 
1991).  Ponomon and Wendell (1995) published one of the first auditing studies comparing the performance of 
judgmental and random sampling methods, finding that statistical methods of determining bounds were superior to 
auditors‟ judgments of bounds.  They go on to state that “firm management needs to be cautious when employing 
judgmental procedures for selecting and making subjective inferences about the underlying population under exami-
nation” (Ponomon and Wendell 1995, 33).  While their study and several others highlight the potential danger in us-
ing judgmental sampling in practice, the superiority of statistical audit sampling has yet to be tested in the courts. 
 
Despite the apparent superiority of statistical over nonstatistical sampling, studies consistently show that 
statistical sampling has nearly disappeared in practice.  Sullivan (1992) of the Public Oversight Board reported the 
he could not recall a single use of statistical sampling in peer reviews of 742 engagements.  In their study of 64 au-
dits from three large accounting firms, Elder and Allen (1998) found that auditors often used statistical sample selec-
tion methods, but none used statistics to evaluate sample results.  More recently, a survey of audit practitioners from 
CPA firms, public companies and government offices showed that 85 percent of recent sampling applications were 
nonstatistical (Hall, et al. 2000). 
 
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
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In recent decades, the volume of litigation alleging auditor failure has swollen to such proportions that na-
tional attention has been focused on this issue.  In 1992, the AICPA reported that more than 3,000 suits were pend-
ing against U.S. accounting firms, seeking damages in excess of $13 billion (AICPA 1992).  Palmrose (1991) identi-
fied 800 audit failure allegations against 16 of the largest U.S. audit firms from 1960 to 1990.   Although most of 
these cases were resolved without a trial, the preponderance of those going to trial were tried before a jury.  Thus, 
exploration of jury decision-making is highly relevant to our understanding of auditor litigation. 
 
An auditor‟s failure to comply with GAAS is often conclusive evidence of negligence, though determining 
if such a failure occurred is highly subjective.  In most cases, “any significant error or mistake in judgment will 
create at least a presumption of negligence that the professional will have to rebut” (Arens and Loebbecke 2000, 
116).  However, the manner by which two acceptable sampling approaches may affect juror negligence judgments 
has not been empirically tested.   
 
Given the potential pitfalls of nonstatistical sampling, the widespread use of nonstatistical sampling, and 
the proliferation of auditor negligence trials, the question of juror judgments involving sampling evidence is impor-
tant.  The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of sampling method on jurors‟ judgments in auditor negli-
gence trials.  Jurors empanelled in civil trials and junior business students independently determined verdicts and 
damages in cases involving either statistical or nonstatistical audit sampling methods that were alleged to be insuffi-
cient.  Findings indicate that the sampling method did not significantly affect the likelihood of an unfavorable ver-
dict, though damages awarded were significantly higher when nonstatistical sampling was used.  Further, explorato-
ry analysis of jurors‟ sample size expectations reveals that such expectations are unreasonably high. 
 
The next section discusses the use of statistical evidence in the courts, followed by sections on hypotheses, 
method, results, and discussion of results, respectively.  The final section includes limitations of the study and con-
cluding remarks. 
 
2.  Statistical Evidence In Courts 
 
2.1.  Case Law 
 
Statistical evidence and probabilistic calculations are commonly used in U.S. court rooms to create evi-
dence, establish evidence reliability,, or measure a financial impact of an act (Smith et al. 1996; Fienberg 1996).  
Typically such evidence is introduced at trial to implicate or exonerate a defendant in a criminal case, though statis-
tical evidence is increasingly being introduced in civil cases such as discrimination, antitrust, and environmental liti-
gation (Fienberg 1989).  There is a distinct difference between a statistical method being related to evidence intro-
duced at trial (see examples above) and a statistical method being used in an event that is the subject of the trial (the 
focus of this study).  The following discussion of statistical evidence introduced at civil trials is provided to give the 
reader a sense of the courts‟ acceptance of statistical methods and jurors‟ interpretation of such methods.  For a more 
complete review and discussion of cases, see Fienberg (1989) and Degroot et al. (1986).   
 
In an often-cited case involving statistical estimation to determine damages, a Sears Roebuck store filed for 
a $27,000 tax refund for overpaid taxes caused by an error in determining where the taxable boundaries lay in the 
town (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v City of Inglewood, LA Sup. Ct. 1955).  A statistician randomly sampled 33 of the 826 
sales days resulting in a point estimate for the refund of $28,250, with a 95 percent confidence interval for the 
amount from approximately $24,000 to $32,500.  The court rejected these sampling results and forced the store to 
conduct a complete audit of the 826 days, resulting in a figure of $26,750.22 to which Sears was entitled.  Clearly 
the courts rejected a statistical estimation that was quite accurate. 
 
In Putnam Resources v Lloyds of London,
1
  Sammartino, Inc. was a third party custodian that held Put-
nam‟s gold.  Sammartino management was convicted of theft and the company went bankrupt.  Putnam sought 
payment from its insurer, Lloyds of London, who refused to pay based on grounds that the policy was not in effect 
                                        
1 Unpublished decision, U.S.D.C. RI 1991.  Olinsky et al. (1996) provide a more detailed discussion of this case. 
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when the theft occurred.  The key issue in the case was determining when the gold was stolen.  Lloyd‟s forensic ac-
countants took a sample of invoice records to accomplish this task. However, they did so by haphazard selection.  
Statistical experts contested the conclusions, suspecting that a bias may have existed in such a method. Lloyds ulti-
mately prevailed.  Though it is impossible to determine why the jury found for Lloyds, the bulk of the their case 
rested on the statistical sampling results of the forensic audit. 
 
With the advancement in medical and technology fields, courts began to exhibit concern in the early 1980s 
that statistical evidence based on a single test may be over-implicating or misunderstood by the jury.  For example, 
one ruling expressed “that statistics on the frequency with which certain blood type combinations occur in a popula-
tion will be understood by the jury to be a quantification of the likelihood that the defendant, who shares that combi-
nation of blood characteristics, is guilty” (State of Minnesota v Kim 1987, 548).  Today, statistical evidence is “still 
occasionally viewed with suspicion because of skepticism about whether it really works” (Fienberg 1989, 153).  
This skepticism highlights the importance of auditors‟ reliance on sampling procedures to test financial statement 
assertions if such procedures were to be challenged in court. 
 
2.2.  Empirical Research 
 
Much of the research on statistics‟ use in court has focused on the behaviors jurors exhibit when presented 
with various forms of statistical evidence.  Decision making research, in general, indicates that people often misun-
derstand or misapply probabilistic information (Tversky and Kahneman 1971; Kahneman and Tversky 1973; Nisbett 
and Ross 1980).  Tversky and Kahneman (1971) found that people will make stronger inferences from a small sam-
ple than is warranted. This is termed “the law of small numbers.”  Nisbett and Ross (1980) found that people over-
value single cases of anecdotal evidence compared to statistical evidence.  In a groundbreaking study, Wells (1992) 
found that jurors are reluctant to find for the plaintiff based solely on probabilistic evidence.  Specifically, Wells 
found a difference “between saying that there is an 80 percent chance that something is true and saying something is 
true based on evidence that is 80 percent reliable,” (Wells 1992, 746), finding jurors more likely to convict in the lat-
ter case.  The Wells effect has been found to be a robust phenomenon (Niedermeier et al. 1999) and illustrates the 
difficulty jurors can have in interpreting statistical evidence. 
 
Note that the above empirical studies do not compare statistical to nonstatistical evidence presented at  
trials, and the empirical studies related to evidence at trials did not compare statistical and nonstatistical evidence.  
With this lack of empirical evidence on the subject, we turn to a theory regarding jurors' decision-making processes, 
the story model, in developing the following hypotheses. 
 
3.  Development Of Hypotheses And Other Questions 
 
There is great variation in jurors‟ use of probabilistic evidence (Smith et al. 1996), and audit sampling re-
sults are probabilistic in nature.  The following discussion develops the hypotheses regarding how jurors will react 
to judgmental versus statistical sampling procedures that failed to uncover a fraud. 
 
3.1.  The Story Model 
 
 One perspective of juror decision-making is offered by Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie (Pennington and 
Hastie 1993; Hastie1999).  Their theory is called the "story model" because it posits that story construction is the 
central cognitive process in jury decision-making. The notable claim of this theory is that the story constructed by 
the juror determines the juror's decision.  In this view, jurors reach their decision in three stages of processing:  (1) 
evidence evaluation through story construction, (2) representation of the alternative verdicts as categories with a list 
of attributes, and (3) matching the story with the verdict attributes. 
 
 During the first stage, jurors construct a narrative by combining a) evidence presented at trial, b) their own 
knowledge about similar events, and c) general world knowledge about what makes a plausible story (e.g., know-
ledge about motives).  While jurors may construct more than one story, only one will usually be accepted as the 
"best."  The principles that determine whether a juror will accept a given story are called certainty principles.   
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Certainty consists of coverage and coherence (Pennington and Hastie 1993).  Coverage refers to the extent to which 
the story accounts for the evidence.   A story which leaves evidence unaccounted for will inspire less juror confi-
dence, and thus it is less likely to be accepted.  To be considered coherent, a story must be plausible, i.e., it must 
"make sense" to a juror according to his knowledge about what typically happens in the world.  The story must also 
be consistent: it must contain no internal contradictions. Finally, the story must be complete, containing all the es-
sential elements of a story: initiating events, psychological states, actions, and consequences.  In civil litigation, ju-
ries pay particular attention to the latter story element (completeness), looking for evidence that the defendant made 
an explicit choice to deviate from ordinary care (Hastie 1999). 
 
 The second processing stage consists of the jurors' representation of the alternative verdicts.  Most of the 
knowledge for this stage is received during the judge's instructions on the law.  For jurors with no prior legal know-
ledge, learning these categories can be difficult.  The final stage in jury decision-making consists of matching the 
"best" story with each of the verdict alternatives. During this stage, jurors will again focus on the key actions of the 
defendant: those which are alleged to have caused the plaintiffs' loss. This stage may also involve application of the 
judge's procedural instructions, if there are any. 
 
3.2.  Hypotheses 
 
 In this study, jurors are to determine whether an auditor is guilty of negligence by reason of the sampling 
procedures not uncovering fraudulent sales invoices.  The plaintiff attorneys allege the sample size was too small, 
thus precluding the auditors from discovering the fraud.  In evaluating an audit failure when the auditors used statis-
tical sampling, jurors are likely to encounter difficulty at several points in story construction.  First, jurors typically 
do not comprehend statistical or probabilistic information.  Thus, the second knowledge component (knowledge 
about similar events) will be unavailable to them, and they will find it difficult to construct a plausible story.  
Second, jurors may find it more problematic to assign a motive to an alleged statistical miscalculation in statistical 
sampling than to the auditors' judgment error in nonstatistical sampling.  Sample size is clearly an auditor choice in 
judgmental sampling.  But it is difficult to characterize the auditors as having chosen to make an error in the statis-
tical sampling scenario.  Without the element of psychological state, the story construction will be incomplete.  
Thus, the story model would predict that jurors will not construct as plausible a “story” when plaintiffs allege negli-
gence regarding statistical sampling procedures as compared to allegations regarding judgmental sampling.  This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: In a case alleging insufficiency of audit sampling procedures, the likelihood of a verdict “guilty of negli-
gence” will be higher when nonstatistical methods were used than when statistical methods were used. 
 
While the question of guilt is certainly a central one, a further question is one of the “degree” of guilt.  This 
degree of guilt would be reflected in the damages awarded by jurors.  Jurors often have difficulty separating the lia-
bility assessment from the damage assessment, even when given specific instructions to consider damages based 
solely on the plaintiff‟s injury.  This “fusion” of the liability and damage assessments is commonly attributed to ju-
rors discounting the award because of uncertainty about the defendant‟s liability (Wissler et al. 2001).  Research has 
found that jurors who were doubtful about the defendant‟s liability compromised with other jurors on liability in ex-
change for a reduced award (Hans and Lofquist 1992), and compensatory awards were lower when the defendant‟s 
fault was ambiguous than when the defendant‟s fault was clear (MacCoun 1996). 
 
In this study, the story model would predict that evidence related to statistical procedures would be less 
likely to produce a plausible story when compared to evidence related to nonstatistical procedures, introducing more 
doubt or ambiguity about the defendant‟s liability when statistical sampling was used.  The increased doubt or am-
biguity is expected to result in lower damages.  This leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
H2: In a case alleging insufficiency of audit sampling procedures, damages awarded will be higher when non-
statistical methods were used than when statistical methods were used. 
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3.3.  Other Questions 
 
 Jurors are likely to have little prior experience with audit methodologies.  The “expectation gap” between 
what an audit actually entails and what financial statement users expect an audit to entail could certainly extend to 
sampling procedures.  Non-auditors‟ expectations regarding sample sizes have not been studied, nor have any influ-
ences the sampling method may exhibit on those expectations been studied.  To explore these questions, this study 
asks jurors who arrive at guilty verdicts to estimate how many items in the population the auditor should have tested.  
Specifically, they were asked what sample size would have been adequate for them to change their verdict.  This 
leads to the following exploratory questions: 
 
Q1: What proportion of the population would be considered to be adequate enough to change a guilty verdict to 
a not guilty verdict? 
 
Q2: Does the sampling method affect the jurors‟ notion of an adequate sample size? 
 
4.  Method 
 
4.1.  Participants 
 
Eligible jurors for the study were drawn from two sources, an actual juror pool and a group of junior-level 
business students.   The juror sample was obtained through the cooperation of the jury clerk and the presiding judge 
of the state trial division in a medium-sized western city.  The jurors had been summoned and empanelled to serve 
on civil cases during a period of 15 months.  Frequently, civil cases are settled "on the eve" of trial.  The jurors par-
ticipating in the study had already arrived for their trials when they learned their trials had been settled.  They were 
asked to complete the experimental instruments while their checks for one day's jury pay were being prepared.  The 
cases were numbered, with the two scenarios randomly distributed, before being given to the jury clerk, who read 
the instructions to the jurors and collected the completed instruments.  Instruments were distributed to 88 jurors, 
with 81 usable instruments being returned.   
 
The student sample was obtained by requesting volunteers from two junior-level management information 
systems classes, 41 of whom returned usable instruments.  The students were given class time to complete the com-
plete the instrument, were read instructions identical to those read to the jurors, and completed the instruments in the 
presence of one of the researchers.  Junior-level students were judged to be suitable participants because they are of 
legal age to serve on a jury.  This is consistent with other jury research (e.g., Kadous 2000, 2001).   
 
A questionnaire that accompanied each case solicited demographic information including age, years of 
education, gender, income bracket, marital status, and general viewpoint (conservative, moderate, liberal).  Partici-
pants also indicated if they had served on previous civil juries or if they had ever been sued or had sued someone.  
Demographic information is summarized in Table 1.  The demographics for the juror pool are comparable to those 
obtained by Buckless and Peace (1993).  While the students differed from the jurors in several predictable ways 
(e.g., age, income, marital status), analysis of their voting patterns and damage assessments for each case scenario 
revealed no significant differences between the students and empanelled jurors.  For the analyses that follow, the 
empanelled jurors and student participants were combined.  This is also consistent with current research (e.g., Kad-
ous 2000, 2001). All of the demographic variables were regressed on the dependent variables (verdicts and damag-
es).  No demographic variables were significantly related to the verdict (guilty or not guilty).  Age was mildly signif-
icant (p<.08) with regard to the damages variable, where older participants were more harsh in their damage assess-
ments.  Thus, the statistical tests of damages will control for the age of the participants. 
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Table 1:  Participant Demographicsa 
 
 
Student 
(n=41) 
Juror 
(n=81) 
Overall 
(n=122) 
Age (mean)b 24 41 35 
Years of Education (mean) 15.1 14.6 14.7 
Gender:  M 
               F 
  51 % 
  49 % 
34% 
66 % 
40 % 
60 % 
Family Incomeb:     
   <$50 K  
   $50 - $100 K 
   >  $100 K 
  
71 % 
  7 % 
  0 % 
   
 49 % 
42 % 
  5 % 
 
57 % 
30 % 
  3 % 
Marriedb 51 % 78 % 
 
69% 
Previous Jury Service   7 % 13 % 11% 
Previous Involvement In Litigation   5 % 10 %    8 % 
Views:   
   Conservative 
   Moderate 
   Liberal 
  
35 % 
52 % 
13 % 
  
30 % 
62 % 
  8 % 
 
32 % 
59 % 
  9 %  
 
a  Percentages may not sum to 100% because not all participants answered all demographic questions. 
b  Difference between students and jurors is significant at p<.01 level.  Further analysis confirmed that though the students and 
jurors do demographically differ, student participants did not respond to the dependent variables in a significantly different 
way than juror participants (p=.83 for verdict dependent variable; p=.58 for damages dependent variable).  Thus, statistical 
tests of hypotheses were performed on the combined participant group. 
 
 
4.2.  Case Instruments 
 
 Each participant received a packet of case materials, including general information, jury instructions, a de-
scription of the litigation and testimony of expert witnesses, a verdict sheet, and a demographic questionnaire.  The 
general information explained the purpose of an audit, stating that “auditors usually use sampling” and “sampling is 
a generally accepted audit practice.”  Participants were also told that expert witnesses have “considerable knowledge 
and experience in a field.”  They were told they had been selected as a juror in a civil case involving creditors (plain-
tiffs) and an accounting firm (defendants), and they were instructed to read the facts of the case and decide whether 
or not the accounting firm was negligent, and if so, provide a dollar amount of damages the firm should pay.  Partic-
ipants were provided a definition of negligence and instructed to base their decision on the “majority of evidence.” 
 
All versions of the case began with a description of the litigation, summarized as follows.  The plaintiffs 
were a group of creditors of Intermountain Restaurant Supply Co., a wholesale restaurant supply company that had 
recently filed bankruptcy following an employee‟s disclosure that $84 million (10%) of the company‟s sales were 
fictitious.  The defendant auditors had considerable experience in the industry, and they had audited Intermountain 
for four years.  Intermountain had nearly 12,000 sales transactions, of which 800 were fictitious.  In conducting the 
audit, 100 sales invoices were examined
2
 and no discrepancies were found.  The auditors thus concluded they could 
rely on the sample results.  The creditors were suing the auditors for negligence, seeking $8 million in damages.  
The creditors claim the sample was too small, thus the auditors were negligent. 
The case scenarios were reviewed by an attorney specializing in civil litigation, the presiding judge of the 
                                        
2 This sample size is sufficient to support a high degree of reliance on the client's internal controls, at the 95% confidence level.  (see Arens 
and Loebbecke 2000, 448 – 457). 
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trial division, and several former auditors, including one individual who does a substantial amount of expert testi-
mony in auditor negligence cases.  The entire instrument was then pre-tested using a group of twenty graduate stu-
dents.   
 
4.3.  Experimental Conditions 
 
 The study employed a between subject, two-level single factorial design. Jurors were randomly assigned to 
one of the two experimental conditions that differed in the type of sampling method used (statistical or nonstatistic-
al).  Both versions of the case contained a brief statement that the “plaintiffs claim that this sample is clearly too 
small, since it did not detect any of the fraudulent sales.”  Such a statement was necessary to establish the basic 
foundation for the negligence allegation.  The cases included one of the following paragraphs to introduce the sam-
pling approach taken by the auditor and the plaintiffs‟ allegations: 
 
Statistical Condition:  An expert witness for the auditors testified that sampling is a widely accepted audit 
technique, and that the audit firm had used statistical methods to determine the sample size.  Based on their statistic-
al analysis, the auditors were 95% confident that there were no serious errors in the sales invoices.  Put another way, 
the auditors would have detected a fraud such as this in 19 out of 20 cases.  However, an expert witness for the 
plaintiffs testified that the auditors had made an error in their statistical calculations.  According to the expert, if the 
appropriate statistical method had been chosen, a larger sample size would have been used. 
 
Nonstatistical Condition:  An expert witness for the auditors testified that sampling is a widely accepted 
audit technique, that determining sample size is a matter of professional judgment, and that he agreed with their de-
cision to sample 100 items.  An expert witness for the plaintiff testified that, while sampling is a widely accepted 
audit technique, and determining sample size is a matter of professional judgment, he believed the auditors‟ decision 
to sample only 100 items was clearly a mistake.  In his judgment the sample should have been larger. 
 
After reading the case materials, jurors were asked if they believe the defendant auditors are “guilty or not 
guilty of negligence.”  The participants who selected “guilty” were then asked to indicate the damages the audit firm 
should pay (from zero to $8 million).  This provided two dependent variable measures corresponding to H1 and H2, 
respectively:  a dichotomous measure of guilt and a continuous measure of damages. Further, if a guilty verdict was 
selected, the participant was asked to indicate “how many invoices would need to be sampled to change your verdict 
to „not guilty‟.” 
 
5.  Results 
 
5.1.  Juror vs. Jury Decisions 
 
In testing the hypotheses, individual responses were treated as surrogates for jury decisions.  Prior research 
has indicated that the jury‟s ultimate verdict corresponds to the first-ballot results in at least 90 percent of the trials 
studied (Kalven and Keisel 1966; Sandys and Dillehay 1995).  Thus, though jurors act in concert to produce a jury 
evaluation (i.e., group decision), using the individual participant assessments is an appropriate and more efficient 
approach in analyzing verdicts (see Kadous 2000, 2001).  Likewise, civil damage awards are the result of a group 
process with each juror bringing his or her own damage estimates into the deliberation process.  Those that consider 
the defendant as “not guilty” and thus not responsible for the act will be deliberating the damage amounts alongside 
those who view the defendant as “guilty” and thus financially responsible. . Therefore, combining and averaging all 
participants‟ damage awards is appropriate. The jury damage award can be viewed as an expected loss value of the 
defendant audit firm 
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5.2.  Hypothesis Tests 
 
Overall, 76 participants (62 %) recommended guilty verdicts.  H1 is tested using a chi-square test for equal 
proportions of guilty verdicts, the results of which are presented in Table 2.  The auditors were found "guilty" of 
negligence more often when judgmental sampling was used.  However, the difference in treatment proportions com-
pared to the population proportions was not statistically significant (p<.37).  Thus, hypothesis one was not sup-
ported.  
 
Recall that in each case instrument, if the subjects determined the auditors to be negligent, they were asked 
to also determine the extent of damages (ranging from zero to $8 million) to be assessed against the auditors.  This 
provides a measure of "how negligent" the participants perceived the auditors to be. H2 was tested using a t-test for 
differences in mean damages (see Table 3, Panel A) and using a regression with a control variable for age (see Table 
3, Panel B).  Mean damages assessed against auditors are $2,043,933 when statistical sampling is used, and  
$2,929,032 when nonstatistical sampling is used.  This difference is significant (p<.05, one-tailed) and in the pre-
dicted direction.  Hypothesis two is supported.   
 
5.3.  Exploratory Analysis 
 
 Participants arriving at “guilty” verdicts were asked,  “how many invoices would need to be sampled to 
change your verdict to „not guilty‟?”  Five of the 76 participants with “guilty” verdicts did not answer this question, 
resulting in a sample of 71 for this portion of the analysis.  Recall that the auditors sampled 100 of the 12,000 sales 
invoices in their testing (0.8%).   This would be an unusually large sample in practice (Elder and Allen 1998). Our 
first exploratory question addressed what the participants would consider to be an adequate sample size.  The mean 
number of invoices that would need to be sampled to change the verdict was 2,070 (17.25% of the population), with 
the range of the responses being quite wide (see Table 4, Panel A).  Fifty-one percent would require 1000 or fewer 
invoices to be tested to change their verdict, 27% would require 1,200 to be examined, and 17% would require more 
than 1,200 but less than 12,000 to be examined.  Four participants (6%) would require the entire population to be 
examined in order to change their verdicts.  There was nothing distinct about these four participants, either demo-
graphically or treatment-wise.  Interestingly, the most frequent response was 1,200 invoices, a sampling fraction of 
10%.  It appears that these participants were using a heuristic measure in determining what an adequate sample size 
would be, yet 10% is a very high sampling fraction rarely seen in practice. 
 
 Our second exploratory question addressed whether the sample size required to change the verdict was dif-
ferent depending on the type of sampling method used.  First, the demographic variables were examined for possible 
influences.  Second, the number of invoices was regressed on sampling method, and several demographic variables.  
Results are presented in Table 4, Panel B. The demographic variables that affected participants‟ response to the 
question were whether they had served on a jury (resulting in lower sample size expectations, p<.07), whether they 
had been directly involved in a lawsuit (resulting in higher sample size expectations, p<.07), and age (older jurors 
expecting larger sample sizes, p<.10).  The sampling method did not significantly affect jurors‟ sample size expecta-
tions (p<.51).  
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Table 2:  Guilty and Not Guilty Verdicts 
 
 N Not Guiltya Guiltya 
Statistical Sampling Used 60 
25 
(41.7%) 
35 
(58.3%) 
Judgmental Sampling Used 62 
21 
(33.9%) 
41 
(66.1%) 
 122 
46 
(37.7%) 
76 
(62.3%) 
 
2 = 0.79  p < .37 
a  Response to question, “As a juror in this case, do you believe the defendant auditors are guilty or not guilty 
of negligence?” 
 
 
Table 3:  Damage Awards 
Panel A:  Means 
 
 N Mean Damagesa Std. Deviation 
Statistical Sampling Used 60 $2,043,933 2,955.200 
Judgmental Sampling Used 62 $2,929,032 3,088,970 
 122   
 
t = 1.62, p < .05, df = 120 
 
 
Panel B:  H2 Regression Resultsc 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t  p-value 
Intercept 1,330,320 806,787 1.65 0.102 
Age 44,674 19,699 2.27 0.025 
Sampling Method 
(1=statistical) 
-929,568 545,536 -1.70 0.046b 
 
Dependent Variable = Damages 
Adj. R2 = .054,  Model F-value = 4.29; p<.02, df = 115 
a  Response to question, “If you answered “guilty” to question one:  please indicate the amount of damages 
(between zero and $8 million) you believe the audit firm should pay.”  Subjects responding “not guilty” 
were considered to have assessed zero damage values. 
b   Test of H2 is one-tailed; results are in the predicted direction. 
c   Six participants did not provide their age, thus this analysis has  n=116. 
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Table 4:  Sample Size Sufficiency 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics -- Number of Invoices to Change Verdict a 
 
Descriptive Measure Number of Invoices 
Mean 2,070 
Standard Deviation 3,006 
Maximum 12,000 
Minimum 120 
Median 1000 
 
Response Ranges Number (%) Responding 
b 
120 – 1000 invoices 36 (50.7%) 
1,200 invoices 19 (26.8%) 
2,000 – 9000 invoices 12 (16.9%) 
12,000 invoices 4 (5.6%) 
    TOTAL 71 (100%) 
 
 
Panel B:  Regression Results 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t  p-value 
Intercept 322 972 0.33 0.742 
Jury (1=yes)c -2,020 1,083 -1.86 0.067 
Suit (1=yes)d 2,455 1,324 1.85 0.068 
Age 42 25 1.69 0.097 
Sampling Method 
(1=statistical) 
455 665 0.69 0.500 
 
Dependent Variable = Invoices 
Adj. R2 = .057, Model F-value = 1.99; p-value = 0.106, df = 66 
a Response to question:  “If you answered „guilty‟ to question one:  please indicate how many invoices 
would need to be sampled to change your verdict to „not guilty‟.” 
b Of the 76 participants who believed the defendant auditors to be “guilty” of negligence, five did not  
respond to this question.  Thus the total n=71. 
c Response to question:  “Have you ever served on a civil jury?” 
d Response to question:  “Have you ever sued someone or been sued?” 
 
 
6.  Discussion 
 
The central issue of this study is whether the method of sampling affects jurors‟ judgments against auditors 
in negligence trials.  As posited by Pennington and Hastie‟s (1993) story model, the use of statistical methods 
(which are more difficult to understand) was expected to make the construction of a plausible story associating the 
defendant with a guilty verdict less likely.  The results are in the direction expected with both the percentage of 
guilty verdicts and damage awards, however, only the damage awards were significantly affected by the sampling 
method.  One might question whether the use of statistical methods makes either verdict, guilty or not guilty, less 
likely.  Recall the story model‟s element of completeness when constructing the stories.  Specifically, jurors in a civ-
il negligence trial look for evidence that the defendant made an explicit choice to deviate from ordinary care (Hastie 
1999).  It is possible that participants, given the general difficulty people have in understanding and interpreting sta-
tistics, could imagine themselves making an honest mistake in a statistical calculation but could not see themselves 
making such a mistake in judgment.  Another perspective on the jury decision process may be provided by attribu-
tion theories. 
 
An attribution is defined as “an inference about why an event occurred or about a person‟s dispositions or 
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other psychological states” (Weary et al. 1989, 3).   In a jury trial, the juror is an ex post “observer” of a recon-
structed event making an attribution about that event.  It is the jurors‟ job to consider the evidence, making a final at-
tribution in the form of a verdict and damages, if applicable.  While a number of potential biases or errors in attribu-
tions have been noted, the best documented is the “fundamental attribution error” (Ross 1977; Weary et al. 1989).  
Attributions can be categorized as external (physical, social circumstances surrounding the action) or internal (ac-
tor‟s ability, motivation, attitude, emotional state).  Attributors have a tendency to “overestimate the importance of 
personal or dispositional factors relative to environmental influences” (Ross 1977, 184).  The fundamental attribu-
tion error is a very robust finding (Weary et al. 1989).   
 
In this study, the auditors were alleged to have chosen an insufficient sample size.  In the case of statistical 
sampling, the allegations stated that the auditors “made an error in their statistical calculations” and if the correct 
statistical methods had been chosen “a larger sample size would have been used.”   This alleged calculation error is 
clearly an internal factor.  In the case of judgmental sampling, the allegations stated that the “decision to sample on-
ly 100 items was clearly a mistake” and “the sample should have been larger.”  This is also clearly an internal factor.  
However, in the case of judgmental sampling, instead of a statistical miscalculation, the auditors were alleged to 
have made a mistake in judgment.  Given that auditor judgment is a conscious act, this level of consciousness high-
lights the factor from an attribution perspective (as well as from a story model perspective).  This leads jurors to 
over-attribute the judgmental error to the auditor vis a vis the statistical error. 
 
Attribution theory also recognizes that people often try to infer the motivations of others in making an attri-
bution (Kelley 1973).  In the context of this study, if the auditors are perceived as being motivated to cut corners by 
examining fewer items,
3
 that motivation would contribute to the jurors attributing the company‟s loss to the auditors.  
Kelley (1973) discusses several dimensions of motivation in attribution.  One dimension that applies in this study is 
the ability to freely choose the behavior.  If the actor‟s behavior is perceived as being largely the result of forces 
beyond the actor‟s control, then motivation would be perceived as low and, in turn, the behavior would be less likely 
to be attributed to the actor.  In this study, judgmental sample sizes are entirely under the control of the auditor, 
while making statistical sample size mistakes might be perceived as being more accidental than intentional.  Thus, 
the judgmental sampling approach provides more motivation for the auditor to use insufficient sample sizes, and 
damage awards in judgmental sampling are larger.  
 
7.  Limitations And Suggestions For Future Research 
 
 One limitation of this study is the simplistic design of the cases.  This was intentional given that the effect 
of sampling method on juror judgments has not been studied, and a more simplified case lessened the chance of con-
founding variables being present.  In this study, we chose to strengthen the internal validity, a trade-off that often 
decreases external validity.  Future research in this area might include simplistic and more complex cases, as prior 
research demonstrates that case format influences verdicts (Pennington and Hastie 1993).   
 
 Another limitation of the study is that the case was devised so that the evidence was stacked against the au-
ditor.  This was considered necessary to give merit to the allegation that the sample size was insufficient in the sta-
tistical sampling case.  In that case, the argument for sample size insufficiency due to a miscalculation was the most 
straightforward.  However, other factors that drive statistical sample sizes could have been challenged by the plain-
tiff attorneys.  It might be interesting to see if the results would also be noted in a case where the evidence against 
the auditor was more ambiguous.  Future research might also include defendant expert witnesses rebutting the alle-
gations of insufficient sample size. 
 
8.  Summary and Implications for Practice 
 
This study found that allegations of errors of judgment in judgmental sampling applications resulted in ju-
rors awarding 43% higher damages than when statistical miscalculations in statistical sampling applications were al-
leged.  Further, for those who considered the auditors guilty, the sample sizes  that would be necessary to convert 
their verdicts to not guilty was excessively large regardless of the sampling method employed.   
                                        
3  Sullivan (1992) states that “the most plausible reason for (auditors using judgmental sampling) “is that nonstatistical sampling plans are less 
expensive.” 
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Judgmental sampling is the most frequently used method of sampling employed by external, internal, and 
governmental auditors.  External auditors, in particular, use judgmental sampling with the defense that it is allowa-
ble by GAAS, in effect extending this to mean that it would be defensible in court. But auditors should remember 
that jurors are perhaps operating under decision making models that result in a more favorable legal outcome for one 
GAAS-approved method (statistical) over another GAAS-approved method (judgmental) of sampling.  This study 
used cases where the auditors were alleged to have insufficiently sampled sales invoices, the result of which was 
failure to discover a fraud.  Overall, regardless of the sampling method used, the participants were more likely to 
find the auditors guilty of negligence than not guilty.  Participants also had very high expectations regarding the 
sample size that they would consider sufficient to exonerate the auditor of the negligence charge.  However, perhaps 
the most important implication that this study brings to the audit practitioner is in regard to damages.  Errors in 
judgmental sampling resulted in nearly $900,000 (43%) more in damages being awarded the plaintiff, compared to 
damages awarded when the error was in a statistical calculation.  This study involved a relatively small monetary 
amount, where the plaintiffs were seeking only $8 million in damages.  In today‟s litigious environment, extrapolat-
ing the  difference between statistical and judgmental sampling mistakes could easily be a much  larger number.   
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